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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

passage, navigation, commerce, or transportation. At common law,
tidewater beds extended to the high water mark and the Crown owned
the soil between the high-water mark and the low-water mark. The
court reiterated the rule that Georgia now holds title to the beds of all
tidewaters within the state, except where a private party can trace its
title to a valid crown or state grant which explicitly conveys the tidewater beds. The burden is on the grantee to show an explicit conveyance
that demonstrates clear intent on the part of the crown to part with
ownership of the tidewater beds in question. Further, the court strictly
construes any ambiguity in Royal grants against the grantee.
Upon reviewing Black's grant, the court found that the words were
completely illegible. The court held that indecipherable Crown grants
were inadmissible at summary judgment and Black failed to present
other evidence supporting his claims at the motions hearing. The
court added that, even if the Crown issued grants containing the language alleged by Black, they would still lack clear intent on the part of
the Crown to convey ownership of the tidewater property along Sterling Creek. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower
court and granted summary judgment in favor of Floyd and the State
of Georgia.
JonathanLong
KANSAS
Hawley v. Kansas Dep't of Agric., 132 P.3d 870 (Kan. 2006) (holding
that the Kansas Division of Water Resources correctly applied a Kansas
water right forfeiture statute because the Kansas legislature intended
for water rights to comply with a "use it or lose it" philosophy).
Karen and Marlin Hawley ("Trustees") inherited the right to appropriate water from the Republican River in Kansas from their father,
Max, who had received the right from his father, E.E. Conzelman. The
record showed that the water users failed to put this water right to
beneficial use for thirty-one successive years, from 1971 to 2001. In
May 2003, the owners of other water rights in the same area requested
the Kansas Department of Agriculture's Division of Water Resources
("DWR") pursue a abandonment trial for the water right.
In December 2003, the DWR filed a report concluding the Trustees
had made no beneficial use of the water from 1971 to 2002 and had
not shown sufficient cause for the non-use. DWR gave notice to the
Trustees of a hearing to determine whether the water right should be
abandoned and terminated under the Kansas Water Appropriation
Act.
After a formal termination hearing, the chief water engineer
adopted the DWR hearing officer's recommendation to issue an order
of termination of the water right. The Trustees filed a petition forju-
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dicial review, and the Republic County District Court entered judgment in their favor and set aside the DWR's termination of the water
right. The DWR appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Kansas.
The sole issue before the court was whether the DWR correctly interpreted a Kansas statute originating from the Kansas Water Appropriation Act which allowed for the termination of a water right after
five successive years of non-use. The statute contained a notice provision requiring the chief engineer to notify the water right holder after
three years of non-use that abandonment and termination procedures
would commence if the water right holder failed to beneficially use of
the water within five years. The Kansas legislature designed this provision to give the water right holder the opportunity to take action to
remedy the situation to preserve the right.
The Trustees did not use their water right for thirty-one successive
years, and thus the debate concerned whether or not this lengthy period negated the notice provision. The DWR argued that the lengthy
period of non-use made the three year notice requirement a moot issue, while the Trustees maintained that the notice requirements were
substantive, remedial, and should have been applied retroactively. The
Trustees further argued that the DWR's compliance with the notice
provision of the Kansas statute was a condition precedent to the termination of a water right, no such notice had been given, and as a result,
the court should have set aside the termination order.
The court engaged in an extensive discussion of the history and
development of Kansas water law, which is based on a system of prior
appropriation for water rights, to ascertain legislative intent. The court
concluded that the Kansas legislature intended to create an act of forfeiture in the statute. It based this conclusion upon three foundations:
case law from other jurisdictions with similar statutes such as Nevada;
the interpretation of the phrase "shall be deemed abandoned" in general property law; and the 1999 amendment to the Kansas Water Appropriation Act. The 1999 amendment increased the permitted nonuse period from three to five years, and the court determined that this
did not change the original interpretation of the statute as one of forfeiture and not abandonment, but merely extended the timeframe for
termination of a water right.
Accordingly, the court found that the DWR correctly interpreted
the Kansas statute. Specifically, the court held that the DWR's interpretation of the statute agreed with the fundamental principle that
"[b]ecause all water within the state is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to control and regulation of the state, then
holders of water rights who fail to use the rights lose the rights." The
court concluded that the State could place conditions on the retention
of a right that it created.
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The court also found that the Kansas statute contained other safeguards to prevent a water right holder from losing his or her right.
These safeguards included a provision that the water right holder may
demonstrate good reason for non-use, and a list of acceptable reasons
for non-use. Because these safeguards are built into the statutory
scheme and the overriding motivation behind the scheme is "use it or
lose it," the legislature could not have intended to provide for other
safeguards it did not explicitly mention.
Based upon its holdings, the court reversed the district court's order and affirmed the DWR's decision declaring that the water right
should be abandoned and terminated.
Charles Sweet
MONTANA
Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Mont. Dep't of Natural Res. and Conservation, 133 P.3d 224 (Mont. 2006) (holding an interpretation of groundwater must consider prestream capture of tributary groundwater).
Montana Trout Unlimited and eleven other petitioners (collectively "Trout") filed suit in the District Court of the First Judicial District, County of Lewis and Clark, against Montana Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation ("DNRC") seeking writ of mandate compelling DNRC to make a determination of whether groundwater was immediately or directly connected to surface water before
processing groundwater applications on the Upper Missouri River basin under the Basin Closure Law. Trout also argued that DNRC's definition of "immediately or directly connected to groundwater" inappropriately excluding prestream capture of tributary groundwater.
DNRC and Trout entered into a stipulation where DNRC agreed to
consider whether groundwater was immediately or directly connected
to surface water prior to processing permits, but retained its definition
of groundwater. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DNRC. The issues on appeal in the Supreme Court of Montana
are whether Trout exhausted its administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief and whether DNRC's interpretation of groundwater-immediately or directly connected to surface water-was correct
as a matter of law.
The court determined that Trout need not exhaust its administrative remedies because the futility exception applied. The court found
that Trout was not required to participate in agency proceedings that
were costly and expressly prohibited by the legislature. The Basin Closure Law expressly prohibited DNRC from processing applications for
groundwater which were immediately or directly connected to surface
water. Therefore, it was futile to require Trout to wait for DNRC to

